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INTRODUCTION

Appellant Robert Magness in his opening Brief of October 29, 2015 raised
three specific issues on appeal: (I) the trial court erred in failing to make sufficient
Vi)

findings of fact to address the undisputed evidence proffered by Defendant that
was in conflict with the statements of the prosecutor ; (2) the prosecutorial
misconduct of the deputy district attorney in misrepresenting the desires of the
complainant violated Defendant's due process rights and caused him to forfeit his
right to a preliminary hearing and trial by jury; and (3) alternatively, Defendant is
entitled to withdraw his guilty plea under Section 77-13-6(2)(A) U.C.A. since the
record shows that the plea was not knowingly or voluntarily made. (Appellant's
Brief, p. i).
The State, for whatever reason, has chosen to consolidate its arguments
solely as to the third issue raised by Appellant thereby causing defendant Magness
and this Court to pick and choose portions of the State's Brief that may be
pertinent to the first two issues. In order to maintain continuity, defendant
Magness will address the original three issues as outlined in his opening Brief and
will reply to the State's arguments whenever they can be discerned.
It should be emphasized, once again, however, that all of the relevant factual
statements in this appeal are contained solely in the Affidavits submitted by the
defendant and by the dialogue during the plea agreement proceeding. See all of the
1
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affidavits in Addendum C of the State's Brief). In fact, the very attorney-- Tad
May-- who prosecuted this case from the beginning of the alleged assault was
unexplainably reassigned from this matter on the very date that the lower court was
considering whether the plea agreement should be vacated; thus preventing even
Mr. May from being able to explain his prior conduct.
Defendant submits that without any rebuttal evidence or affidavits submitted
by the State, it must be assumed as a matter of law that the State had nothing in
opposition to offer to contradict the version of facts submitted by Defendant and
therefore, this Court must assume all factual statements relating to these issues are
true as recited by Defendant.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO MAKE
SUFFICIENT FINDINGS OF FACT TO ADDRESS
THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE PROFFERED BY
DEFENDANT.
The State has made no direct attack upon Defendant's argument that a
remand for factual findings or an evidentiary hearing should be made as to the
direct contradictions between the telephonic statements of the victim versus the in
court statement made by prosecutor Tad May. The State attempts to minimize the
telephone transcript that was proffered to the lower court on the basis that "the
prosecutor merely misunderstood her priorities when he spoke with her at intake."
2
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(State's Brief, p. 22). The State makes no attempt to discuss the subsequent events
after the "intake" that occurred months later at the scheduled preliminary hearing.
The conflict of facts is striking: the Affidavits of Mr. Long and Mr. Magness
unequivocally stated that at the time of the preliminary hearing Mr. May
represented to defense counsel and Defendant that the victim did not seek prison
time for the defendant. The lower court adopted this position in her ruling by
noting that at the time he spoke with the victim she was not seeking prison time.
(Ruling and Order, p. 2). On the other hand, the victim in her statement to
defendant's investigator emphatically stated that she always sought prison time and
had informed the prosecutor that from the moment of the sexual event she wanted
to see Defendant go to prison and also to be listed as a sex offender. Obviously,
either Mr. May was misrepresenting what he had been told by the victim or the
victim was misrepresenting what she had told Mr. May. In either case, however, a
material conflict clearly exists which requires a factual hearing and a ruling as to
the truthfulness of one side or the other since it relates to both prosecutorial
misconduct and the setting aside of the guilty plea.
As noted in the Defendant's opening Brief, appellate law requires that the
lower court must assess the credibility of conflicting evidence and make detailed
findings as to all relevant facts pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Utah Rules of
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Criminal Procedure. In spite of such a request, the lower court refused to do so.
(Defendant's Brief p.21).
However, the issue of a remand for further factual findings or an evidentiary
hearing becomes only relevant if this Court rejects Defendant's argument as to
prosecutorial misconduct contained in Point II and/or rejects Defendant's Point III
that the plea was not made voluntarily or knowingly in light of the
misrepresentation of the victim's state of mind. If either of these issues is resolved
in Defendant's favor then this remand request by Defendant becomes moot.
POINT II
THE PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT OF THE DEPUTY
DISTRICT ATTORNEY MISREPRESENTING THE DESIRES
OF THE COMPLAINANT VIOLATED DEFENDANT'S DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS AND CAUSED HIM TO FOREGO HIS
RIGHT TO PRELIMINARY HEARING AND TRIAL BY JURY.
Defendant in his opening Brief spent six pages extensively arguing that the
conduct of the deputy district attorney Tad May during the preliminary hearing
date of June 6, 2013 constituted actionable misconduct by misrepresenting the
attitude and desires of the complaining witness. (Defendant's Brief pp. 22-27) The
State in its Brief makes no reference whatsoever to this event. The Affidavits of
Mr. Long and Mr. Magness clearly indicate that deputy district attorney Tad May

was so upbeat in his assessment as to the victim's attitude towards leniency that
they willingly gave up a scheduled preliminary hearing examination. In other
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words, the statements of Mr. May at this proceeding planted the seeds that later
grew and blossomed a year later in accepting the plea agreement.
The State has offered no contrary evidence or testimony to contradict the
vl

claim that Mr. May informed both the defendant and Mr. Long that the victim did
not seek prison incarceration for the defendant and that a favorable plea agreement
could probably be reached in the future based upon her attitude. The State has
made no attempt to refute the legal authorities cited by Defendant that such
misrepresentation violates the duty of a prosecutor to maintain a fair playing field
in order to allow defendants to make knowledgeable decisions during the entire
course of a legal prosecution.
Moreover, the State has failed in its briefing requirements to answer the
contention raised by Defendant in his opening Brief. This Court has held that "an
issue is inadequately briefed when the overall analysis of the issue is so lacking as
to shift the burden of research and arguments to the reviewing court." State v.
Sloan, 2003 UT App. Sec. 170, ,I 13, 72 P.3d 138 (Utah App. 2003). Moreover,
the argument portion of a brief must contain citations to the record as required by
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. "A party may not rely upon this
Court to make his arguments for him." Id.
Similarly, this Court in Utah v. Randy J. Montoya, 837 P.2d 145 (Utah

~

1997) stated the following:
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Under Rule 24(b ), an appellee must provide an argument "containing
the contentions and reasons of the [appellee] with respect to the issues
presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the
trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record
relied on. When an appellee fails to comply with this rule, we will decline to
address the issue because the "reviewing court is entitled to have the issue
clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository
in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and
research." State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988). This Court has
routinely failed to consider arguments which are not adequately briefed on
appeal. (quoting State v.Yates, 834 P.2d 599 (Utah App. 1992).
Indeed, appellate courts while applying a high standard of briefing on an
appellant under Rule 24(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure also require
an equal burden on an appellee under Rule 24(b ). In numerous instances appellees
have voided their right to argue against an appellant for inadequate briefing. See,
Angel Investors, 2009 UT 40, ~~ 34-36; Advanced Restoration v. Priskos, 126 P.3d
786 (Utah App. 2005); State v. Roberts, 2015 UT 24 (Utah 2015).
Defendant's claim of prosecutorial misconduct permeates the entire
proceeding and is not focused solely upon the change of plea hearing as contained
in the third issue of Defendant's Brief. Here, the defense was misled on June 6,
2013 by the misrepresentation of district attorney Tad May that the complaining
witness did not seek prison and was so optimistic about her attitude that the longexperienced defense attorney Larry Long decided to waive the very critical
preliminary hearing that was already prepared for cross examination of the
complaining witness and her girlfriend. Obviously the statements made by Mr.
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May were very persuasive and created a strong impression that the complaining
vJJ

witness was not vindictive over an incident that occurred while a drunken party
was being held.
On January 5, 2015 the defense was ready to file a number of motions that
had been postponed for over a year due to various circumstances. It was on this
occasion that Mr. May once again approached the defense and offered the plea
agreement again based upon his assertion that the complaining witness did not seek
a prison incarceration. Thus, it was not only the isolated hearing of January 20} 5
focused upon by the State in its Brief, but it is also the prior events which occurred
in 2013 that convinced two experienced defense attorneys to enter into a plea
agreement based upon a high probability that the complaining witness was not
vindictive and would not ask for a prison term.
The State in its Brief has completely failed to address the separate issue of
prosecutorial misconduct which is separate and apart from the issue relating to the
withdrawal of the guilty plea. The failure to offer any contradicting evidence or to
even have the deputy district attorney Tad May present during the critical 2015
hearing for questioning by the trial court and examination by defense counsel,
should cause this Court to default the State in any argument against the contentions
raised by Defendant. This Court should grant Defendant's motion to reinstate the
criminal proceeding with the right of a preliminary hearing and the right to
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reinstate all of the prior motions and procedures that were terminated by the plea
agreement.
POINT III
DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO WITHDRAW HIS
GUILTY PLEA UNDER SECTION 77-13-6(2)(A) U.C.A.
SINCE THE RECORD SHOWS THAT THE PLEA WAS
NOT KNOWINGLY OR VOLUNTARJL Y MADE.
The crux of the State's argument in attempting to refute this point
(Apppellee's Brief, pp. 13-24) is that it was not important what the victim
previously had told the prosecutor as to her desire for the defendant to go to prison
since the only crucial time period of her intent was at the future time of sentencing.
Thus, the State's argument goes that since the prosecutor did not really know what
the victim would desire at the time of sentencing, the defendant made the plea
voluntarily and knowingly because he was aware that she could always
recommend a prison sentence at the critical time of sentencing.
This argument has two fatal flaws. First, the State has mischaracterized the
statements of the prosecutor at the time of the plea agreement. The State
proclaims:
At the plea hearing the prosecutor expressly stated that his
recommendation for no prison was wholly contingent on MC' s wishes at
sentencing because he had not talked to her since the initial intake and he
was uncertain what her wishes would be by that time. See R. 364: 3,A.
Indeed the condition itself made it clear that the prosecutor was unsure what
MC's sentencing position was and that he was making no promises about
what it would by the time of sentencing. (Appellee' s Brief, p. 16-1 7).
8
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In reality, Mr. May stated to the Court;
When we met initially during the intake, her very first impression of
the case was, actually, she was not seeking prison at the time and was fairly
amenable to resolving the case .... Our recommendation is simply that we
would honor the victim's wishes. (Tr. Jan. 5, p. 4).
Thus, the record shows that unlike the representation made by the State, the
prosecutor did not inform the court that he had no idea as to what the victim would
be seeking at the time of the sentencing. Rather he affirmatively stated that she did
not seek prison incarceration from his prior interaction with her.
Also, he did not inform the court as to his interaction with the victim at the time of
the preliminary hearing in 2013.
Second, the State notes that contract principles may be useful in assessing
whether a guilty plea was knowingly made. (Appellate Brief, pp. 15-16).
Defendant concurs with this analysis. A similar example to the instant case will
suffice to illustrate why this plea should be withdrawn. Presidential candidate
Ricky Ricardo enters into a written contract with former president Fred Murtz that
President Murtz will endorse candidate Ricardo for $500,000 one month prior to
the party convention unless candidate Ricardo is indicted by the IRS for tax fraud.
The $500,000 consideration is paid and is nonrefundable. Five weeks before the
convention the IRS files an indictment against candidate Ricardo and President
Murtz therefore does not endorse him. This scenario would be similar to the

9
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arguments made by the State in its Brief that since neither party knew what was
going to occur in the future, each took their chance in making their contract and
could not therefore complain as to the future outcome.
Now, assume instead that President Murtz had inside information from his
beloved wife IRS Commissioner Ethel Murtz that candidate Ricardo was about to
be indicted by the IRS within the next few months prior to the convention. In other
words, President Murtz knew that his promise for an endorsement was completely
illusionary and that he would be able to keep the $500,000 without an
endorsement. Under this scenario the fact that a future event was about to occur is
immaterial and the focus instead is what the parties knew at the time that the deal
was made.
The arguments made by the State, therefore, fail to recognize that the
uncontroverted evidence offered by the defendant --with no opposing affidavits or
testimony from any witnesses or prosecutor of the state-- clearly shows that the
intention of the victim from the very moment of the event was to imprison the
defendant. All of the cases previously cited by Defendant in his opening Brief
support the legal principle that when making plea agreements all parties must be
dealing with the same information and that no misleading or false relevant
information can be used by the State to induce a guilty plea. (Defendant's Brief
pp.28-30).
10
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Would candidate Ricky Ricardo have paid the $500,000 to former President
xiP

Murtz if he had been informed by Murtz that the IRS was intending to indict him
within a few months? Certainly not. Neither would this defendant have plead
guilty and waived all of his constitutional rights to a jury trial had he been
informed that the victim from the time of the incident always emphatically wanted
him to be imprisoned.
In summary, therefore, this case does not involve whether the victim could
change her mind at the time of sentencing as argued by the State-a risk clearly
assumed by the defendant-but instead involves a misrepresentation of a material
fact at the time of the plea agreement which induced the plea agreement to occur in
the first place.
For this reason, therefore, and for the reasons stated in the opening Brief of
Defendant this plea agreement should be set aside so that a proper trial can take
place.
CONCLUSION
The failure of the State to respond in a logical and sequential manner
requires a somewhat unusual evaluation of this case. First, if this Court adopts the
unopposed arguments made by Defendant as to prosecutorial misconduct contained
in Point II of his opening Brief, this matter should be remanded and allowed to
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proceed at the preliminary hearing stage with all other motions and defenses
reinstated. In such a case, Points I and III become irrelevant.
If this Court decides Point II adversely to Defendant (even though the State
has filed no opposition to it), then the Points I and Points III become relevant. If
this Court finds that the defendant did not make a knowing and voluntary plea as
argued in Point III of Defendant's Brief, then the plea should be vacated and the
matter should proceed to trial. In such a case, Point I relating to the remand for
findings is again immaterial and becomes moot.
Finally, if this Court rejects both Point II relating to prosecutorial
misconduct and Point III relating to the knowing and voluntary plea, then Point I
becomes relevant since the lower court must enter findings to resolve the
inconsistency of the representations made by district attorney Tad May to the
Court versus the statements made by the victim to the defendant's investigator
Defendant requests that this Court carefully examine the contentions of this
Defendant in spite of the inarticulate opposition filed by the State.
DATED this 29th day of February, 2016.

ook
for Appellant
MAILING CERTIFICATE
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I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing Reply Brief of
Appellant to Marion Decker, Assistant Attorney General, 160 East 300 South, 6th
Floor, P. 0. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 this 29th day of
~

February, 2016.
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